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Abstract
Identity fraud detection is of great importance
in many real-world scenarios such as the finan-
cial industry. However, few studies addressed
this problem before. In this paper, we focus
on identity fraud detection in loan applications
and propose to solve this problem with a novel
interactive dialogue system which consists of
two modules. One is the knowledge graph
(KG) constructor organizing the personal infor-
mation for each loan applicant. The other is
structured dialogue management that can dy-
namically generate a series of questions based
on the personal KG to ask the applicants and
determine their identity states. We also present
a heuristic user simulator based on problem
analysis to evaluate our method. Experiments
have shown that the trainable dialogue system
can effectively detect fraudsters, and achieve
higher recognition accuracy compared with
rule-based systems. Furthermore, our learned
dialogue strategies are interpretable and flexi-
ble, which can help promote real-world appli-
cations.1
1 Introduction
Identity fraud is one person using another person’s
personal information or combining a few pieces
of real data with bogus information to deceive a
third person. Nowadays, identity fraud is becoming
an increasingly prevalent issue and has left many
financial firms nursing huge losses. Besides, for
persons whose identities have been stolen, they
may receive unexpected bills and their credit will
also be affected. Although identity fraud is a very
serious problem in modern society, there are no
effective fraud detection methods at present and
little attention has been paid to this problem.
Intuitively, a simple way to detect identity fraud
in loan applications is directly asking applicants
1https://github.com/Leechikara/
Dialogue-Based-Anti-Fraud
Nanjing University Baidu No.3 Gulou Street
The fake personal information of a loan applicant:
System: When was Nanjing University founded?
Applicant: I am not sure.
System: Which is the nearest subway station to Nanjing University?
Applicant: I am not quite clear.
Decision: Fraud (Correct)
System: Which university did you graduate from?
Applicant: Nanjing University.
System: Which company do you work for?
Applicant: Baidu.
System: Where do you live?
Applicant: No.3 Gulou Street.
Decision: Non-Fraud (Wrong)
School Company Residence
Figure 1: Dialogue examples of two possible fraud de-
tection methods. The first one is directly asking appli-
cants about their personal information. The second one
is asking applicants about questions that are related to
their personal information.
about their personal information. However, as
shown in Fig. 1, this method is prone to errors
because fraudsters may well know the fake infor-
mation. Fortunately, we find fraudsters generally
are not clear about answers to questions that are
related to the fake information.2 We refer to these
questions as derived questions, which can be con-
structed based on triplets where the head entity is
the personal information entity. For example, the
first derived question about “Nanjing University” is
based on (Nanjing University, FoundedDate, 1902).
In Fig. 1, the applicant claims to graduate from
“Nanjing University” but can not answer derived
questions about this school. This fact indicates that
the applicant is likely to be a fraudster.
Based on the above finding, we aim to design a
2This finding is based on the premise that loan applicants
answer questions without any help (e.g., using automatic QA
systems or information retrieval tools). In fact, this premise is
reasonable in many real scenarios, such as dialogue with video
calls and phone calls in which we can monitor the applicants
with a camera or require them to answer questions within few
seconds (e.g., 5 seconds).
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dialogue system to detect identity fraud by asking
derived questions. However, there are three major
challenges in achieving this goal.
First, designing derived questions requires a
high-quality KG. However, owing to the sparse-
ness problem (Ji et al., 2016; Trouillon et al., 2017)
of the KG, many entities have no triplets for derived
question generation. Second, randomly selecting
triplets to generate questions is feasible but it is not
the optimal questioning strategies to detect fraud-
sters. Third, because of privacy issues, evaluating
anti-fraud systems with real applicants is not prac-
tical. And existing user simulation methods (Li
et al., 2016; Georgila et al., 2006; Pietquin and Du-
toit, 2006) do not apply to our task. Hence, how to
evaluate our systems efficiently is a problem.
To address the above problems, we first complete
an existing KG with geographic information in an
electronic map (Section 2). In the new KG, nearly
all personal information entities can find triplets for
derived question generation. Then, based on the
KG, we present structured dialogue management
(Section 3) to explore the optimal dialogue strategy
with reinforcement learning. Specifically, our di-
alogue management consists of (1) the KG-based
dialogue state tracker (KG-DST) that treats em-
beddings of nodes in the KG as dialogue states and
(2) the hierarchical dialogue policy (HDP) where
high-level and low-level agents unfold the dialogue
together. Finally, based on intuitive analysis, we
find the applicants’ behavior is related to some
factors (Section 5.1). Thus, we introduce hypothe-
ses to formalize the effect of these factors on the
applicants’ behavior and propose a heuristic user
simulator to evaluate our systems.
Experiments have shown that the data-driven sys-
tem significantly outperforms rule-based systems
in the fraud detection task. Besides, the ablation
study proves that the proposed dialogue manage-
ment can improve the recognition accuracy and
learning efficiency because of its ability to model
structured information. We also analyze the behav-
ior of our system and find the learned anti-fraud
policy is interpretable and flexible.
To summarise, our main contributions are three-
fold: (1) As far as we know, this is the first work
to detect identity fraud through dialogue interac-
tions. (2) We point out three major challenges of
identity fraud detection and propose corresponding
solutions. (3) Experiments have shown that our
approach can detect identity fraud effectively.
2 Knowledge Graph Constructor
There are four types of personal information in a
Chinese loan application form: “School”, “Com-
pany”, “Residence” and “BirthPlace”. To generate
derived questions, we link all personal information
entities to nodes in an existing Chinese KG3 and
crawl triplets that are directly related to them. How-
ever, owing to the fact that the KG is largely sparse,
nearly a half of entities4 cannot be linked. Thus
we use wealthy geographic information about or-
ganizations and locations in electronic maps (e.g.,
Amap5) to complete the KG.
Nanjing University
FoundedDate
1902
Park
Gulou Subway 
StationGulou Park
SubwayStation
Park
SubwayStation
Figure 2: An example of the KG for Nanjing University.
The green edge represents the triplet crawled from the
existing KG and the blue edges represent the triplets
generated based on a navigation electronic map.
Specifically, for each personal information entity,
we first crawl its points of interest (POI6) within
one kilometer and the POI types in the Amap. If
there are multiple POI for the same type, we only
keep the nearest one. Then we generate triplets in
the form of ($Personal Information Entity$, $POI
type$, $POI$) to indicate the fact that the nearest
$POI type$ to the $Personal Information Entity$ is
$POI$. Besides, for any two entities, if the distance
between them is less than 100 meters, we gener-
ate two triplets to represent the bi-directional adja-
cency relation between them. In the end, as shown
in Fig. 2, we combine triplets from the two infor-
mation sources (the Chinese KG and the electronic
map) to construct a new KG. In this KG, nearly all
personal information entities can be linked. And
for each relation7, we design a language template
for the question generation.
3 Dialogue System Design
The overview of our system is shown in Fig. 3.
The core of the system is dialogue management
3https://www.ownthink.com
4Most of them are “Residence” and “BirthPlace”.
5https://www.amap.com
6The POI are the specific locations (e.g., subway stations)
that someone may find useful in navigation systems.
7After the data cleaning, there are 40 relations in all.
Applicant
Natural Language 
Generation
Dialogue Management
Nanjing 
University
FoundedDate
1902 Park
Gulou Subway 
StationGulou Park
SubwayStation
Park
SubwayStation
No.3 Gulou 
Street
SubwayStation
Zifeng Tower
ShoppingMall 
School
Residence
Baidu
Robin Li
Company
Founder
User
Response: D. I am not quite clear
Which is the nearest subway 
station to Nanjing University?
A. Gulou Subway Station
B. Xin Jiekou Subway Station
C. Jimingsi Subway Station
D. I am not quite clear
Question:
System Action:
(Nanjing University, SubwayStation, 
Gulou Subway Station)Not Explored Answer Node
Explored Answer Node
Extinct Worker
Activate Worker
Manager
Figure 3: Overview of our approach. To build the directed graph for dialogue management, we reverse directions
of all edges in the original personal KG to make the head entity read information from its tail entities. Besides,
we add a special node “User” and new edges to represent the applicant’s personal information. In this graph, the
direction of each edge is the direction of message passing in KG-DST. The blue and green edges indicate that two
agents select nodes to unfold the dialogue according to HDP.
which is organized as a directed graph G(V,E). In
each turn, our system first infers dialogue states
with the KG-based dialogue state tracker by com-
puting embeddings of nodes. In this graph, the
embedding of “User” node is the dialogue state of
a high-level agent (manager), and the embeddings
of nodes adjacent to “User” (named as personal
information nodes) are the dialogue states of low-
level agents (workers). Then our system unfolds
the dialogue according to the hierarchical dialogue
policy. Concretely, the manager first selects a per-
sonal information node (e.g., “Nanjing University”)
as the worker, and then the worker will select a
node (e.g., “Gulou Subway Station”) from its pre-
decessors (named as answer nodes). After that, the
sampled nodes of two agents form the final system
action (a triplet). Next, based on the triplet and a
predefined template, the natural language genera-
tion module will give a multiple-choice question to
the applicant. After the applicant gives a response,
the embeddings of all nodes will be updated to
generate new dialogue states for the next turn.
3.1 KG-based Dialogue State Tracker
There are three types of nodes in G(V,E): the
“User” node vu, the personal information node
vp ∈ Vp and the answer node va ∈ Va. In the
t-th turn, KG-DST first gives an initial embedding
to v ∈ Vp ∪ Va. The initial embedding is the
concatenation of static features and dialogue fea-
tures. Then, v will gather information from its
predecessors N(v). After multiple message pass-
ings, we get its final embedding Et(v). Next, vu
will aggregate information from Vp to generate
its embedding Et(vu). Finally, Et(vu) and Et(vp)
are the dialogue states of the manager and worker
respectively.
Static Features. Specifically, for v ∈ Vp∪Va, the
static features include the degree and type. Besides,
for va ∈ Va, we use the “spread degree on the inter-
net” to distinguish different answer nodes because
we find there is an obvious correlation between this
“spread degree” feature and applicants’ behavior in
our human experiments (Section 5.1). To get the
“spread degree” feature, we first treat the answer
node va and its adjacent personal information node
vp as the keyword8, and then search it in the search
engine. The number9 of the retrieved results will
be the “spread degree” feature of va. In the end,
each static feature is encoded as a one-hot vector
and they are concatenated to form a vector St(v).
Dialogue Features. The dialogue features record
the dynamic information of v ∈ Vp∪Va during the
dialogue. Specifically, dialogue features include
whether the node has been explored by the man-
ager or workers and whether the node appeared
in the system action of the last turn. In addition,
for vp ∈ Vp, the dialogue features include the in-
teraction turns of the corresponding worker and
the number of correctly/incorrectly answered ques-
tions about vp. For va ∈ Va, the dialogue features
8In fact, the keyword is the head entity and tail entity of a
triplet. For example, for the answer node “1902”, the keyword
is “Nanjing University 1902”.
9If there are multiple keywords for an answer node (e.g.,
“Gulou Subway Station”), we take the average.
include whether applicants know va is the answer
to a derived question. Similarly, dialogue features
will be encoded as a one-hot vector Dt(v).
Message Passing. In Fig. 3, the applicant does not
know “Gulou Subway Station” is the nearest sub-
way station to “Nanjing University”. In such case,
the personal information about “School” may be
fake. Besides, for another question “What’s the
nearest park to Nanjing University?”, the applicant
may not know the answer because the distance be-
tween “Gulou Park” and “Gulou Subway Station”
is less than 100 meters. Thus, we want the known
information of “Gulou Subway Station” to be sent
to its successors.
Specifically, for v ∈ Vp ∪ Va, we compute its
embedding recursively as follows:
Ekt (v) = max
v′∈N(v)
tanh
(
WkEk−1t (v
′)
)
(1)
where Ekt (v) is the depth-k node embedding in
the t-th turn, N(v) denotes the set of nodes adja-
cent to v,Wk is the parameter in the k-th iteration
and the aggregate function is the element-wise max
operation. The final node embedding is the con-
catenation of embeddings at each depth:
Et(v) =
[
E0t (v), ..., E
K
t (v)
]
(2)
where E0t (v) = [St(v), Dt(v)] and K is a hyper-
parameter.
After getting the embedding of vp ∈ Vp, we
compute the embedding of vu by aggregating infor-
mation from Vp:
Et(vu) = max
vp∈Vp
tanh (WpEt(vp)) (3)
whereWp is the parameter.
In the end, Et(vp) is the worker’s dialogue state
which contains information of a part of the graph
and Et(vu) is the manager’s dialogue state which
contains information of the whole graph.
3.2 Hierarchical Dialogue Policy
After obtaining the dialogue states and node em-
beddings, our system will unfold the dialogue ac-
cording to a hierarchical policy.
Specifically, the manager first selects vp ∈ Vp
as a worker to verify the identity state of vp accord-
ing to a high-level policy pim. Then, the worker
will choose some answer nodes from its predeces-
sors N(vp) to generate questions about vp accord-
ing to a low-level policy piw. If the worker gives
the decision dw ∈ {Fraud,Non-Fraud} about the
identity state of vp, piw will end and the manager
will select a new worker again or give the final
decision. If the manager gives the final decision
dm ∈ {Fraud,Non-Fraud} about the applicant’s
identity state, pim will end. Formally, pim and piw
are defined as follows:
pimt (vp|Et(vu)) ∝ exp (Wm [Et(vu), Et(vp)] + bm)
pimt (d
m|Et(vu)) ∝ exp (Wm [Et(vu), E(dm)] + bm)
piwt (va|Et(vp)) ∝ exp (Ww [Et(vp), Et(va)] + bw)
piwt (d
w|Et(vp)) ∝ exp (Ww [Et(vp), E(dw)] + bw)
(4)
where {Wm,Ww, bm, bw, E(dm), E(dw)} are pa-
rameters, Et(vu) and Et(vp) are dialogue states of
the manager and worker in the t-th turn, E(dm)
is the encoding of the manager’s terminal action
which has the same dimension as Et(vp), and
E(dw) is the encoding of the worker’s terminal
action which has the same dimension as Et(va).
Besides, to prevent the two agents from mak-
ing decisions in haste, domain rules are applied to
their dialogue policies by “Action Mask” (Williams
et al., 2017). Specifically, domain rules are defined
as follows. First, only after all or at least three an-
swer nodes related to a worker have been explored
can the worker make the decision. Second, only
after all workers have made decisions or at least
one worker’s decision is “Fraud” can the manager
make the final decision.
4 Training
4.1 Reward Function
We expect the system can give correct decisions
about applicants within minimum turns. Thus, at
the end of each dialogue, the manager receives
a positive reward rmcrt for correct decision, or a
negative reward −rmwrg for wrong decision. If the
manager selects a worker to unfold the dialogue
in the t-th turn and the worker gives nwt questions
to the applicant, the manager will receive a nega-
tive reward −nwt ∗ rturn. Besides, we provide an
internal reward to optimize the low-level policy.
Specifically, if the worker gives a correct decision
about the corresponding personal information, it
will receive a positive reward rwcrt. Otherwise, it
will receive a negative reward −rwwrg. And in each
turn, the worker receives a negative reward −rturn
to encourage shorter interactions.
4.2 Reinforcement Learning
The two agents can be trained with policy gradi-
ent (Williams, 1992) approach as follows:
∇pimt =
(
Rmt − V mt
(
Et(vu)
))∇ log pimt (amt |Et(vu))
∇piwt =
(
Rwt − V wt
(
Et(vp)
))∇ log piwt (awt |Et(vp))
(5)
where Rmt and R
w
t are the discounted returns of
two agents, amt and a
w
t are their sampled actions,
V mt
(
Et(vu)
)
and V wt
(
Et(vp)
)
are value networks
which are optimized by minimizing mean-square
errors to Rmt and R
w
t respectively.
4.3 Pre-Training
Before reinforcement learning (RL), supervised
learning (SL) is applied to mimic dialogues pro-
vided by a rule-based system. Rules are defined as
follows. First, the manager selects a worker ran-
domly. Then, the worker will select answer nodes
randomly to generate questions. Let ncrt/nwrg de-
notes the number of correctly/incorrectly answered
questions in this worker’s decision process. If
|ncrt−nwrg| ≥ 3 or all answer nodes related to this
worker have been explored, the worker will give
its decision. If ncrt < nwrg, the worker’s decision
will be “Fraud” and the manager’s decision will
be “Fraud” too. Otherwise, the worker’s decision
will be “Non-Fraud” and the manager will choose
a new worker to continue the dialogue. In the end,
if all workers’ decisions are both “Non-Fraud”, the
manager’s decision will be “Non-Fraud”.
5 Experiments and Results
5.1 User Simulator and Human Experiments
Simulating users’ behavior is an efficient way to
evaluate dialogue systems. In our task, the ap-
plicants’ behavior is answering derived questions.
Thus, the key of user simulator is to estimate the
probability p(ki), where ki is a binary random vari-
able which denotes whether or not the applicant
knows the triplet fact ti behind a question qi.
Intuitively, p(ki) depends on three factors. First,
if the applicant’s identity state is “Non-Fraud”,
p(ki = 1) will be greater than p(ki = 0). Second,
the wider a triplet fact ti spreads on the internet,
the more likely applicants know it. For example, al-
most all of applicants know (Baidu, Founder, Robin
Li) because there are a lot of web pages containing
this fact on the internet. Third, if applicants know
other triplets that are related to ti, they may well
know ti because it is easy to deduce ti based on
what they know. For example, if applicants know
(Nanjing University, Park, Gulou Park) and (Gulou
Park, SubwayStation, Gulou Subway Station), they
may well know (Nanjing University, SubwaySta-
tion, Gulou Subway Station).
To formalize the effect of the three factors on
applicants’ behavior, we introduce three hypothe-
ses: (1) For both fraudsters and normal applicants,
p(ki = 1) is proportional to the “spread degree” of
ti. (2) The “spread degree” of ti can be approxi-
mated by the number of retrieved results (denoted
as Freq(ehi , e
t
i)) in search engine where the key-
word is the head entity ehi and the tail entity e
t
i of
ti. (3) For any three triplets, if they form a closed
loop (regardless of directions) and applicants know
two of them, the applicants must know all of them.
To generate simulated loan applicants, we first
estimate the function relations between p(ki = 1)
and Freq(ehi , e
t
i) via human experiments. Specif-
ically, we ask 31 volunteers to answer derived
questions10 about their own and others’ personal
information. And then, for the question qi, we
place it into a discrete bin according to the loga-
rithm of Freq(ehi , e
t
i). In each bin, we use the ratio
of correctly answered questions to approximate
p(ki = 1). In the end, the relations are shown in
Fig. 4. We can find that the statistical distributions
of real behavior patterns of normal applicants and
fraudsters are distinguishable and the results agree
with our first two intuitions.
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Figure 4: The relations between Freq(ehi , e
t
i) and p(ki)
for two kinds of applicants. Freq(ehi , e
t
i) is used to ap-
proximate the “spread degree” of ti. p(ki = 1) indi-
cates the probability that applicants know ti.
Then, we get simulated loan applicants11 follow-
ing a “sampling and calibration” manner. Specif-
ically, given an applicant’s personal information,
we first sample the identity state randomly. If the
10There are 1516 derived questions in all.
11Note that we can generate any number of simulated appli-
cants based on one applicant’s personal information.
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Figure 5: Performance of different systems. Tested on 10 epochs using the best model during training.
sampling result is “Fraud”, we will sample 1 ∼ 4
information item(s) randomly to be the fake in-
formation. Generally, forging information about
“School” and “Company” may result in a larger
loan. Thus, when sampling the fake information,
the sampling probability of “School” and “Com-
pany” is twice the sampling probability of “Resi-
dence” and “BirthPlace”. Then, for each personal
information and its related triplet ti, we sample
ki based on (1) whether the personal information
is fake (2) Freq(ehi , e
t
i) and (3) the corresponding
function relation in Fig. 4. Because the sampling re-
sults {k1, ...,kn} are independent from each other,
there may be the situations where the sampling
results do not satisfy the rule defined in our third
hypothesis. If that happens, we calibrate it until all
sampling results agree with the hypothesis. Finally,
if ki = 1, the applicant will give the correct an-
swer to the question qi. Otherwise, the applicant’s
response is “D. I am not quite clear.”.
5.2 Baselines
We compare our model (denoted as Full-S) with
two rule-based baselines. In addition, to study the
effect of message passing and hierarchical policy
on the model training, we compare Full-S with two
neural baselines for the ablation study.
• Flat Rule: The system selects 10 questions
randomly to ask applicants. If the number of
correctly answered questions is fewer than the
number of incorrectly answered questions, the
system’s decision will be “Fraud”. Otherwise,
the system’s decision will be “Non-Fraud”.
• Hierarchical Rule: A rule-based system which
uses a hand-crafted hierarchical policy to un-
fold dialogues. As shown in Section 4.3, we
use this system to pre-train Full-S.
• MP-S: A neural dialogue system which uses
message passing to infer dialogue states but
uses a flat policy to unfold dialogues. That is,
the manager selects answer nodes directly to
generate derived questions.
• HP-S: A neural dialogue system which uses
the hierarchical policy to unfold dialogues but
does not use message passing to infer dialogue
states. That is, K is 0 in Eq. 2.
5.3 Implementation Details
We collect 906 applicants’ personal information,
and randomly select 706 for training, 100 for dev,
and 100 for test. In each batch, we sample 32
applicants’ information for simulation. The maxi-
mum interaction turns of the system and the worker
are 40 and 10 respectively. The iteration depth
K is 2 in message passing. In the reward func-
tion, rmcrt = 3, r
m
wrg = 3, r
w
crt = 1, r
w
wrg = 1,
rturn = 0.1. The discount factors are 0.999 and
0.99 for the manager and worker respectively. All
neural dialogue systems are both pre-trained with
rule-based systems for 20 epochs. We pre-train
MP-S with Flat Rule because they both use the flat
policy. Besides, we pre-train HP-S and Full-S with
Hierarchical Rule because they both use the hierar-
chical policy. In the RL stage, all neural dialogue
systems are trained for 300 epochs. When testing,
we repeat 10 epochs and take the average.
5.4 Test Performance
We compare Full-S with baselines in terms of two
metrics: recognition accuracy and average turns.
Fig. 5 shows the test performance. We can see
that the accuracy of Flat Rule is lower than Hier-
archical Rule, and the accuracy of the data-driven
counterpart of Flat Rule (MP-S) is just slightly
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Figure 6: Accuracy curves of different neural models in
dev set. The first “20 epochs” indicates the pre-training
stage. The last “300 epochs” indicates the RL stage.
higher than randomly guessing. It means that using
the hierarchical policy to unfold dialogues is neces-
sary for our task. Besides, HP-S achieves a higher
accuracy than its rule-based counterpart (Hierarchi-
cal Rule) within much fewer turns. It proves that
the data-driven system is more efficient than the
rule-based system. Finally, equipped with message
passing and hierarchical policy, Full-S achieves the
best accuracy. And it is interesting to note that Full-
S requires more turns but achieves much higher
accuracy than HP-S. One possbile reason is that
HP-S may easily trap in local optimum without
message passing to infer dialogue states.
5.5 Ablation Study
To study the effect of message passing and hierar-
chical policy, we show the learning curves of three
neural dialogue systems in Fig. 6. Each learning
curve is averaged on 10 epochs.
We find that, compared with Full-S and HP-S,
MP-S is unable to learn any useful dialogue pol-
icy during training. There are two reasons for this.
First, the action space of flat policy is too large,
which results that MP-S suffers from the sparse
reward and long horizon issues. Second, without
explicitly modeling the logic relation between the
manager and workers, MP-S is prone to errors. Be-
sides, we can see that the convergence speed of
Full-S is faster than HP-S in both the pre-training
and the RL stages. This is because message passing
can model structured information of the KG, and
hence Full-S is more efficient in policy learning.
5.6 Manager’s Policy Analysis
To better understand the high-level dialogue policy,
we analyze the manager’s behavior in Full-S.
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Figure 7: Manager’s action probability curves. Each
curve indicates the probability of selecting a piece of
personal information to verify. For each curve, we take
the average of all dialogues during testing.
First, we show the manager’s action probability
curves in Fig. 7. We can see that selecting “School”
and “Company” to verify personal information has
a priority over “Residence” and “BirthPlace” in
the first decision step. And in the following two
decision steps, the probabilities of selecting “Resi-
dence” and “BirthPlace” will increase. This is be-
cause simulated applicants tend to forge personal
information about “School” and “Company” for
a larger loan. Consequently, to discover fake in-
formation faster, the manager learns to prioritize
different information items.
Second, intuitively the manager’s policy should
follow two logic rules in our task:
Rule1: If a worker’s decision is “Fraud” (Cond1),
the dialogue should end immediately and the man-
ager’s decision will be “Fraud” (RS1).
Rule2: If all workers’ decisions are both “Non-
Fraud” (Cond2), the manager’s decision will be
“Non-Fraud” (RS2).
To test whether the manager follows the two rules,
we calculate the probabilities of RS1 and RS2
under Cond1 and Cond2 respectively. Specifi-
cally, in the test data, p(RS1|Cond1) = 0.95 and
p(RS2|Cond2) = 0.96. It proves that the manager
will adopt workers’ suggestions in most situations.
Meanwhile, we study cases where the manager
does not follow the two rules and find some interest-
ing phenomena. Specifically, if only one worker’s
decision is “Fraud” and the applicant can answer a
few questions given by this worker, the manager’s
decision may be “Non-Fraud”. Besides, if all work-
ers’ decisions are both “Non-Fraud” but the appli-
cant can not answer most of the questions given
All triplets that are related to “Shanghai Sports University” (replaced with $School$ for short):
($School$, SuperMarket, Educational Supermarket) ($School$, PetMarket, Seasons Garden)
($School$, LocatedIn, Shanghai) ($School$, FoundedDate, 2002)
($School$, DigitalMall, JinLu Security) ($School$, FruitShop, Xiao Liu Fruit)
($School$, ConvenienceStore, HaoDe) (Xiao Liu Fruit, ConvenienceStore, HaoDe)
(HaoDe, FruitShop, Xiao Liu Fruit)
HP-S Full-S
System: Which is the nearest pet market to $School$? System: Which is the nearest pet market to $School$?
Applicant: I am not quite clear. Applicant: I am not quite clear.
System: Which is the nearest digital mall to $School$? System: Which is the nearest digital mall to $School$?
Applicant: I am not quite clear. Applicant: I am not quite clear.
System: Where is $School$ located? System: Which is the nearest fruit shop to $School$?
Applicant: Shanghai. Applicant: Xiao Liu Fruit
System: Which is the nearest supermarket to $School$?
Applicant: Educational Supermarket
System: When was $School$ founded?
Applicant: 2002
Decison: Fraud (Wrong) Decison: Non-Fraud (Correct)
Table 1: Examples of the low-level policies in two systems. Note that the information about “School” is not fake.
by one worker, the manager’s decision may still be
“Fraud”. In fact, when the two cases happen, the
worker may make the wrong decision. However,
the manager can still give the correct decision. It
means the manager is robust to workers’ mistakes.
5.7 Worker’s Policy Analysis
To better understand the low-level dialogue policy
and the effect of message passing on it, we compare
workers’ behaviors in HP-S and Full-S.
Table 1 shows an example of verifying personal
information about “School” in HP-S and Full-S.
We can see that the two systems give the same two
questions in the first two turns. This is because the
triplets behind the two questions are rarely known
to fraudsters. It means that the low-level policies
learn to give priority to such triplets for better dis-
tinguishing fraudsters from normal applicants. In
the third turn, HP-S gives a question that is easy to
answer for fraudsters and makes the wrong deci-
sion. However, Full-S notices the applicant gives
the correct answer to a question that is hard to an-
swer for fraudsters. Thus, Full-S does not make
the decision in haste but continue the dialogue. Be-
sides, it is worth noting that Full-S has not chosen
($School$, ConvenienceStore, HaoDe) to generate
the derived question. This is because the message
passing mechanism models the relation between
“HaoDe” and “Xiao Liu Fruit”. Specifically, be-
cause the two entities are closely related to each
other, if applicants know “Xiao Liu Fruit”, they
may well know “HaoDe”. Thus, there is no need
to select this triplet anymore.
6 Related work
As far as we know, there is no published work
about detecting identity fraud via interactions. We
describe the two most related directions as follows:
Deception Detection. Detecting deception is a
longstanding research goal in many artificial in-
telligence topics. Existing work has mainly fo-
cused on extracting useful features from non-verbal
behaviors (Meservy et al., 2005; Lu et al., 2005;
Bhaskaran et al., 2011), speech cues (Levitan et al.,
2018; Graciarena et al., 2006) or both (Krishna-
murthy et al., 2018; Pe´rez-Rosas et al., 2015) to
train a classification model. In their work, the defi-
nition of deception is telling a lie. Besides, existing
work requires labeled data, which is often hard to
get. In contrast, we focus on detecting identity
fraud through multi-turn interactions and use rein-
forcement learning to explore the anti-fraud policy
without any labeled data.
Dialogue System. Our work is also related to
task-oriented dialogue systems (Young et al., 2013;
Wen et al., 2017; Li et al., 2017; Gasˇic´ et al., 2011;
Wang et al., 2018, 2019). Existing systems have
mainly focused on slot-filling tasks (e.g., booking a
hotel). In such tasks, a set of system actions can be
pre-defined based on the business logic and slots.
In contrast, the system actions in our task are select-
ing nodes in the KG to generate questions. Thus,
the structured information is important in our task.
Besides, some works also try to model structured in-
formation in dialogue systems. For example, Peng
et al. (2017) used hierarchical reinforcement learn-
ing (Vezhnevets et al., 2017; Kulkarni et al., 2016;
Florensa et al., 2017) to design multi-domain dia-
logue management. Chen et al. (2018) used graph
neural networks (Battaglia et al., 2018; Li et al.,
2015; Scarselli et al., 2009; Niepert et al., 2016)
to improve the sample-efficiency of reinforcement
learning. He et al. (2017) used DynoNet to incorpo-
rate structured information in the collaborative dia-
logue setting. Compared with them, our method is
a combination of the graph neural networks and hi-
erarchical reinforcement learning, and experiments
prove that they both work in the novel dialogue
task.
7 Conclusion
This paper proposes to detect identity fraud auto-
matically via dialogue interactions. To achieve this
goal, we present structured dialogue management
to explore anti-fraud dialogue strategies based on
a KG with reinforcement learning and a heuristic
user simulator to evaluate our systems. Experi-
ments have shown that end-to-end systems outper-
form rule-based systems and the proposed dialogue
management can learn interpretable and flexible
dialogue strategies to detect identity fraud more
efficiently. We believe that this work is a basic first
step in this promising research direction and will
help promote many real-world applications.
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